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Mr. Hale: The focus has been very much on Europe this morning.
I just wanted to ask Professor Canning and Professor Mokyr if they
could comment on China. This country has some very compelling
demographic changes going on. Because of the one-child policy
brought in 35 years ago, the birthrate has fallen very low and we are
missing 400 million Chinese compared with what would have
happened with the birthrate that we had in the 1960s.
Second, the society is now aging very rapidly. By 2040 China will
have 400 million people over the age of 60, compared with 50
million 10 years ago.
Third, there is no pension system. But despite the lack of a pension
system, they already have a savings rate of 40 percent, which means
that somebody is at least getting ready for this problem of retirement.
Finally, because of this one-child policy, there is a real imbalance
between boys and girls. In the next 10 years, China will have 50 or
60 million more boys than girls for the age group 20 to 35 because of
this preference for boys. 
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73Could you comment as to how you see all these different factors
playing out? Are we looking at possible great instability or just a
transition, which will follow the old industrial countries that we’ve
seen before? 
Mr. Feldstein: I wanted to comment on a couple of things that
were said. One was about the fact that dissaving doesn’t seem to be
as much in retirement years as lifecycle theory would suggest. That
takes too narrow a definition of dissaving. After all, a lot of people
have defined benefit pension plans. So, if you ask what their finan-
cial assets are at age 65, that includes the present value of all those
future defined benefits and that goes down as they age and receive
benefits. Of course, the most important of those is Social Security.
From the individual’s point of view, they are behaving rather like the
theory suggests. They are using up the line of credit that they have
as they age.
A very important point was made about the financial incentives for
early retirement. There are a number of very interesting studies that
Jon Gruber and David Wise have done on the European experience,
where the problem is really terrible. The incentives to retire early are
very strong and they drive up the costs, and therefore the payroll tax
rates, in Europe. We have done a very good job in the United States
of changing that over time, so that we are essentially an actuarially
fair system.
I have one question and that is the word “divorce” wasn’t
mentioned. Yet, that has to be a major factor, I would have thought,
in demographics. I wonder how that comes in to the kind of calcula-
tions and projections that are being done.
Mr. Ferguson: I would like to pick up a bit on what David Hale
said. It is not just a question of the Chinese gender imbalance, but
also to pick up on Joel Mokyr’s point and add some comments on
the fact that mortality rates are actually going up in a number of
countries because of HIV/AIDS. We have the phenomenon now
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than it was for someone born in Russia 40 years ago. There are a
number of other countries, including China, that show this gender
imbalance throughout southeast Asia and even in some parts of
India and other subsets. 
So, if any of the professors could comment on how these demo-
graphic influences are likely to change or modify the views that we
have heard, that would be helpful.
Ms. Woodall: There has been much discussion this morning about
how changes in the dependency ratio affect growth rates. I wondered
how changes in the average age of the working population might
affect growth rates. I know in the UK I have seen some study that
suggests that the productivity of a typical worker rises up to the age
of about 40. From then on, there is evidence they become less effi-
cient. So, as the average age of the working population gets older,
what are the implications of that for average productivity growth?
Mr. Taylor: I want to raise a financial factor that is implicit in the
discussion of migration in the paper and actually in some of the other
papers. That is this issue of remittances from immigrants back home.
There is more and more interest in this in the international financial
institutions and so forth. We are getting more and more information.
The numbers are mind-boggling. Right now, it looks like at least
$100 billion of remittances goes from the developed countries to the
developing countries. We are looking at ways to reduce the cost, have
the funds used more effectively, but it is many times the total amount
of foreign aid. So, the question I have is that maybe it is a way to get
at some of these externality issues that were mentioned in trying to
compensate losers. Obviously the funds going back home to families
are a benefit to the country from which the immigrants came. It is a
question of omission and maybe a question as well.
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David Canning, or for Chairman Greenspan. I find myself confused
with respect to the two roles that I have. As a macroeconomist and
someone concerned with the importance of national saving, I worry
that retirement ages are coming down rather than going up. I see the
benefit of people working longer, so as to enable us to keep our fisc
in better balance. As the leader of an institution that has—surely as
in what Chairman Greenspan referred to as the conceptual sector of
the economy—I observed with the elimination of mandatory retire-
ment, professors and other academic personnel are now retiring at an
age on average of about 72, with that figure rising from mandatory
retirement at 65 a decade ago. I view this trend with terror as repre-
senting a serious problem. It is my impression that my counterparts
who lead conceptual research organizations in the private sector or
hospitals or law firms have somewhat more leverage over their staffs
than I do, but view similar trends with similar kinds of concern,
except that they take more effective measures. If one looks at a
number of leading financial institutions, one would find, for
example, that in the most intellectual and senior functions within
those institutions there would be almost no one over the age of 60
and certainly over the age of 65. I wonder how to square what seems
like microeconomic rationality in the face of the kind of data of the
kind of experience that Pam Woodall referred to with this kind of
macro trend.
Ms. Swonk: I have two comments. One is on remittances because
that is a big issue that I’ve been looking at as well. The follow-up is
not only the remittances going back to families, but also entrepre-
neurial knowledge and capital going back and starting up small
businesses. There have been some studies that have suggested that a
lot of our entrepreneurial knowledge is being exported, which is a
very good thing for many of these developing countries as they get the
money back. That is a comment on that. 
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having large families, which I think economists just don’t understand
women, but that is another issue—but I also think there is an issue,
and I wonder because I observe it in very wealthy families—is the
ability in developed nations to extend fertility way beyond a woman’s
fertility. We have a vice presidential contender whose wife had chil-
dren at age 48 and 50, well beyond when most people would think
women of having children. This change may affect demographics
going forward of wealthy families being able to extend their fertility
much longer than we saw in the past.
Mr. Canning: The questions on the sex ratio and divorce are very
good questions. We haven’t addressed those issues in our research, so
I don’t think we can say very much about them.
The big worry in giving a talk like this is someone comes up with
a good contra-example to what you say. China isn’t the contra-
example. China is probably one of the best examples of a country that
is getting the benefits of a high ratio of workers to dependents today
and also the savings effects. It actually seems to fit the model perfectly.
It is much more extreme, it is much faster, and so the effects are
happening in a much more compressed space of time than we’ve seen
in other countries because of its policies. I agree completely with the
point about the problems associated with defined benefits, as shown
in the Gruber and Wise reference.
About the problem in Europe that it is very hard for people to work
longer because of the institutional arrangements, I think something
will probably have to be done. The point here that Lawrence
Summers made is a good one. Forced retirement, in a sense, over-
comes the problem of getting rid of unproductive workers in a very
easy way. It is an institutional challenge. What you are really getting
at is a combination of tenure and no retirement age. It is an institu-
tional factor rather than a fundamental one. But the institutions will
have to evolve to cope with it; though I would like to revisit you
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that stage.
Mr. Summers: Like Bob Solow’s view, my view is the age at which
people are most wise and productive is explained by a very simple
rule. I take my age and add five years. I have found that rule to be
predictive of my views for the last 25 years.
Mr. Canning: We didn’t mention HIV/AIDS, which is a very
important issue for Africa. It is driving down life expectancy, it is
causing a high mortality rate, but it isn’t actually affecting income per
capita very much because it is reducing income; however, it is also
producing reducing capitas. The long-term effects of HIV/AIDS will
be seen on savings behavior and education. The signs that we have at
the moment are very worrying for the long-term future of Africa
because of this decline in longevity.
On the average working-age effect, we have done some models
where we add experience effects. We do find a modest effect of the
working age on macroeconomic performance, however it doesn’t add
up to very much. The countries with a higher working age tend also
to have longer periods of schooling, so the experience effects are quite
small. The experience advantage of the developed countries over the
developing ones is not as big as you would expect. There will be an
effect of an aging population in terms of worker productivity, because
we know the experience effects. In terms of the macroeconomic
impact so far, these have been rather modest.
The question of remittances and return migration is really impor-
tant. It is important to recognize that most migrants—when they
migrate—plan to return home and large numbers of them do. They
send remittances home. When they return home, we have strong
evidence that they earn higher wages. They seem to build up human
capital as part of their migration. So, migration is not only an issue
for developed countries as a way of overcoming their aging popula-
tions, but for developing countries it is a path toward development.
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ments for migration are properly managed, it is potentially a very,
very powerful force.
Mr. Bloom: To add a comment or two about the AIDS epidemic:
Roughly, 55 million people die every year in the world. Last year, 3
million people died of AIDS. In terms of its global impact on mortal-
ity, this is not overwhelmingly huge. But it is problematic insofar as
the impact is concentrated in certain countries and in those countries
80 to 90 percent of AIDS mortality occurs among individuals in their
20s, 30s, and 40s—the prime working ages essentially. We have done
a number of calculations for several countries to try to simulate the
economic impact of AIDS mortality using the notions discussed this
morning of the importance of age structure and population growth.
It turns out that, in fact, there is significant potential for declines in
income per capita, but that potential is confined to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa where roughly 2.3 million of the world’s 3 million
AIDS deaths that occurred.
There was another question about the mortality crisis in Russia,
which refers to the precipitous decline in life expectancy that began
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We have estimated that this shift is
associated roughly with 1.5 million premature deaths—individuals
who died before one would have expected based on mortality rates
that prevailed in the 1980s.
The Russian mortality crisis is quite interesting in a number of
respects. First of all, the mortality is disproportionately concentrated
among men in their 50s and 60s. Also, it does seem to be associated
with the transition to a market economy. However, we have done
some fairly detailed analysis of the economic consequences of this
mortality crisis and find that it is not big enough to have had an
appreciable effect on Russia’s macroeconomic performance.
General Discussion 79Mr. Greenspan: I would like to add a point to the implicit dynam-
ics of change that seem, in my judgment, to be inevitable, which
starts at the early part of the 20th century with the very significant
increase in longevity against an institutional structure which is very
rigid in enforcing people to retire or to move into different activities.
In democratic developed countries, an ever-increasing proportion of
the electorate is going to be elderly people, and it is they who are
being essentially barred from continuing to work. So, political pres-
sures, in my judgment, are going to gradually break down. I don’t
know whether it is going to enforce the 72-year age, but we will basi-
cally say that it is the president of Harvard’s age plus five. 
Another issue that I think ought to be emphasized, which I tried to
point out implicitly in my prepared remarks, is the emphasis invari-
ably on the question of demographic change and many other aspects
is on saving with the implication that the investment that savings will
create will yield some rate of return that will enhance productivity. It
strikes me that the data are far more mixed in this issue. The produc-
tive use of savings varies extraordinarily over history and across
countries. We obviously were aware that centrally planned
economies, especially in countries like the Soviet Union and earlier
versions if not the current version of China, had exceptionally high
savings rates and no productivity. In a sense, the savings were wasted.
That they were created in the first place was obviously of no particu-
lar use to the economy or the society. In evaluating the incidence of
savings and its direction without advertence to how those savings will
be employed is less than half of a story. Here, the question of technol-
ogy and increased multifactor productivity generally is really a crucial
issue. That is an issue of education, institutions, incentives, and a
variety of other things, which are only very indirectly related to
savings. We are going to find that as the economics of demography—
if we want to define it as the more recent version, not necessarily
1750 forward but clearly the latter part of the 19th century
forward—the full implications of that are only just beginning to
become evident. The next generation of economists is going to be
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impacts, which we are only very marginally addressing today.
Mr. Mokyr: I want to make one brief point in response to the ques-
tion about divorce, which drove home for me the real differences
between what a modern age looks like and what things used to be
until the beginning of the 20th century. That is, we have by and large
changed the role of the family in making allocative decisions about
the formation of human capital and about retirement. Until about
1900 or so, the vast bulk of these decisions were handled within the
family. If there were an aged person who could no longer work, that
person did not “retire.” Basically, the person’s children took care of
them. Lacking that, of course, there were state institutions that were
the safety net, but certainly the family was the first recourse. That is
no longer the case. We have basically dethroned the family’s role in
that capacity and substituted for it a set of formal institutions on the
federal or local level or perhaps things like pension funds in which the
family really plays no role. That is quite crucial in understanding why
we have reached the situation that we have reached and what the
source of the problem is. 
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